This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly recruits. Discriminatory behavior by the employer is isolated in a treatment where workers cannot send signals. We find that gender disparity among promoted workers is highest when workers can apply for promotion and employers recruit. Strikingly, the gender composition in competitive position is balanced in the absence of a signaling institution. When signaling is possible, we observe that female workers who do not request a promotion are discriminated against.
Introduction
The gender wage gap is a conspicuous phenomenon in labor markets. Though policymakers have carried out many attempts to attenuate the pay gap, it turns out that women still earn significantly less than men. In 2013, data of the OECD countries revealed an unadjusted gender wage gap of 15% (OECD, 2016) . Many explanations exist for this prominent wage differential. There is evidence that a large fraction is caused by performance differences (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 1992) . That is, women often work part time (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008) , do not choose competitive high-income jobs (Daymont and Andrisani, 1984) , and rarely work in executive positions (OECD, 2016) .
The question remains: "why are women underrepresented in these areas?" One reason may be that gender differences in professional development exist. First, women often anticipate a shorter work life and therefore are less likely to advance their academic (Kahn, 1993) and professional careers (Blau and Kahn, 2000) . Second, women may ask less often for job promotions (Babcock and Laschever, 2009 ).
1 In a field experiment Leibbrandt and List (2014) show that women are less likely than men to negotiate on wages. Recently, laboratory studies highlighted the role of gender differences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Villeval, 2012) and offered behavioral explanations for womens' reluctance to apply for promotion. The experiments of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) demonstrate that women tend to "shy away from competition." Even more men choose the tournament when knowing that their co-participant is female (Datta Gupta et al. 2013) . Experimental evidence also demonstrates that women perform worse than men in competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003) . The gender differences in competitiveness are fundamental and even occur for children (Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2014) . Some experiments revealed that a female quota for winning competitive tournaments may help to increase the number of women (Balafoutas and Sutter 2012; Niederle et al. 2013 ) and girls (Sutter et al. 2016 ) who behave competitive. Closing the competitiveness gap may be of importance for equalizing wages, as empirical evidence demonstrates that competitive individuals earn more in their jobs (Reuben et al., 2015) . The experimental examples illustrate that attitudes toward competition may explain why women refrain from selecting competitive jobs or rarely apply for promotion. Although, these findings provide interesting insights, they neglect an important aspect of the labor market: the "demand side." The adjusted gender wage gap is positive and suggests that supply-side-based differences cannot fully explain the occurrence of the pay differential. There is evidence that 1 the demand-side matters, i.e., employers may be prone to stereotyping and discriminate against equally qualified women in remuneration (Heinz et al., 2016) or hiring decisions (Reuben et al., 2014; Bohnet et al., 2015; Beaurain and Masclet, 2016) . The presence of employers also crucially matters for the professional development of employees. First, it may be that few women are promoted because employers favor male applicants over female applicants. Second, demand-side issues may spill over to the supply side. More precisely, the low existence of female executives may be a result of women not applying for promotion as they might anticipate the discriminatory behavior of employers. Thus, analyzing the interplay of the supply and demand side in job-promotion decisions is promising, as it helps to understand how competitive positions are achieved.
In this paper we present an experiment on job-promotion decisions where workers and employers simultaneously decide. The experiment aims at investigating the impact of promotion opportunities for the filling of competitive positions. We study the role of gender differences in competitiveness when women can apply for a job promotion in the presence of employers. A major interest is whether female applicants anticipate that workers may discriminate against them. The experiment also investigates employers' reactions, i.e., whether employers discriminate against females when workers can apply for a promotion. Moreover, we focus on the treatment of employees who decide not to apply for a job promotion. Our experiments extend the real-effort framework of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . In the main treatment employees first decide whether to apply for a competitive job or whether to work under a piece rate. In a next step, the employer is informed of the number of applicants for the job and their gender. Afterwards, the employer makes the promotion decision. Finally, the workers generate the firm revenue in their allocated positions (competitive or non-competitive job). We make use of two control treatments which isolate the impact of job-promotion opportunities on the behavior of employees and employers. The first control treatment tests whether the possibilities females have to apply for promotion affects employers' choices. Therefore, workers cannot apply for job promotion in this treatment. Another control treatment isolates whether women anticipate possible discrimination by the employers. Here, the promotion decision is not taken by an employer. Instead, the selection is made by the computer.
Our data find a substantial gender gap in competitive positions when employees can apply for these positions. We find that more than 70% of competitive positions are held by male employees, whereas only 29% of women advance to competitive jobs. A closer look indicates that females signal their willingness to compete significantly less often than males. Notably, this drives our gender gap in access to competitive positions in two aspects. First, males are more likely to be selected as they more frequently send signals. Second, employers prefer to promote male employees when male and female employees decide not to apply for promotion. We do not observe raw discrimination against female workers in the absence of the opportunity to send signals. In this case the gender pay gap shrinks, i.e., only 55% of men hold competitive positions.
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of females' access to competitive positions. The insights on the effects of job-promotion opportunities may help to improve the design of job environments to attenuate the gender wage gap.
Experimental design 2.1 Design overview
In our experiment, we use the real-effort task introduced by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . Participants perform a simple arithmetic task where they add sets of five twodigits numbers for five minutes. Our experiment is divided into four games. In the first game, all participants perform the task and are paid according to a piece-rate payment scheme. They receive e0.50 for every correctly solved problem. In game two, all participants enter a three-player, winner-takes-all tournament. They are matched with two counterparts, and performances are compared to determine payoffs (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) . The participant that achieves the best performance receives e1.50 for every correctly solved problem. The two losing participants do not earn payment for this game. Ties at the top position are solved with a random draw. The third game resembles an experimental promotion game to which participants take part either in the role of worker or the role of employer. We conduct three treatments which follow a betweensubjects design that differs in the actions participants can undertake in game three. We describe this game in further detail in the next subsection. Finally, we elicit participants' risk attitude in game four of our experiment. We implement the lottery-choice task introduced by Eckel and Grossman (2002) . Participants are given six gambles with two possible outcomes (low payoff/high payoff) each. Both events occur with a likelihood of 50%. The lotteries differ both in expected payoffs and in the variance of the outcome distribution (see table 1 below). Choices are numbered from 1 to 6 and are sorted from the safest to the most risky lotteries. Risk is measured as the standard deviations of payoffs (Eckel and Grossman 2002 
The promotion game
In game three of the experiment, participants are randomly assigned either to the role of an employer or of a worker. Experimental firms are formed by matching together one employer and three workers. Those groups take part in an experimental setting that we refer to as the promotion game. In each experimental firm, one competitive position is to be filled. In this position the payment of the worker depends on the performance in a winnertakes-all tournament. Whereas, two workers are paid according to a piece rate. The task is exactly the same as the task performed in games two and three of the experiment. The worker who takes part in the tournament is competing against two workers from other firms, who are also taking part in the tournament. For workers, payoffs are similar to those previously described. Under a piece-rate scheme, the worker earns e0.50 for each correctly solved problem. Under the tournament scheme, the worker who performs best earns e1.50 for each problem solved, while the others earn nothing. The employer's payoff is entirely determined by the performance of the three workers in the firm. More precisely, the employer earns e0.20 for each problem correctly solved by workers performing under a piece rate. The employer receives e1 for each problem correctly solved by the worker performing in the tournament, if this worker wins the competition. The employer receives nothing for the problems solved by the worker performing in the tournament if she loses the tournament.
Our experimental setting aims at identifying two main channels through which female underrepresentation in competitive positions may occur. For that reason, we run three treatments that differ in the set of actions available to participants. We first present the Baseline treatment, which allows both workers and employers to take action. We then present the No Selection and the No Signal treatments. The Baseline promotion game consists of three steps. In step one, participants in the role of a worker can state their willingness to enter competition. This statement takes the form of a costly signal that is displayed in the next step to the employer. Workers receive an endowment of e0.20 which can be employed to send a signal or it can be kept for themselves.
2 In step two, the employer selects which worker will get promoted to the competitive position. When employers decide on this they are provided with information regarding workers' demographics (gender, age, level of study).
3 Importantly, employers also receive information on whether workers have sent a signal to apply for promotion. In step three, workers are informed of the remuneration scheme allocated by the employer. Afterwards, workers perform in the task. Workers who have been promoted to the competitive position compete against workers from other firms who were also promoted by their employers. While workers perform the task in the final step of the promotion game, employers face survey questions regarding their beliefs on workers' performances. More precisely, employers are asked to rank the three workers of the firm from the best to the worst-performing in the mandatory tournament of game two.
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We are particularly interested in the gender composition among promoted workers. An unbalanced composition in the Baseline treatment may be due to females "shying away from competition" (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) or because of employers selecting men over women (i.e., gender discrimination). To disentangle between these two potential channels, we implement two additional treatments. In the No Selection treatment, the employer does not select a worker to be promoted. Instead, the selection process is automatic and computerized according to a fair and fully disclosed rule. If only one of the three workers sends a signal, she automatically accesses the competitive position. If more than one worker sends a signal, the computer randomly chooses who among them will access the competitive position. Finally, if no signal is sent the computer randomly picks one of the three workers to enter the tournament. In this treatment, employers do not have direct impact on the selection process. An imbalanced gender composition among promoted participants can only be attributed to gender differences in attitude toward competition.
The No Signal treatment differs from the Baseline in that workers cannot express their willingness to enter the competition. Workers cannot send a signal and employers are only shown demographics (gender, age, level of study) when selecting a worker to be promoted. In this treatment, gender differences in competitiveness have no direct impact on the selection process. Only the choice of the employers could explain a potential gender imbalance in access to promotion.
Experimental procedure
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . In total, 248 participants were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and took part in the experiment (see table 2 below). One hundred and twenty-three women and 125 men participated in the experiment. The subject pool consisted of students from the University of Göttingen from various fields. The sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. Subjects' average earnings were e10.62, including a show-up fee of e5. 
Results
In this section we report our findings. We start with an overview of the overall result on the gender composition in competitive positions. As a next step we focus on the drivers for the emergence of the outcome we observe. We analyze workers' decisions to send a signal and employers' promotion choices in separate sections. When using non-parametric test methods, we always report two-sided p − values throughout.
Gender composition in competitive positions
We first focus on the gender balance in competitive positions, i.e., the proportion of females among the promoted participants. Recall that in the Baseline treatment, the promotion process is affected by both the decision of the worker to send a signal and the choice of the employer. In our control treatments we isolate the drivers for the promotion outcome. First, in the No Selection treatment employers cannot select employees. Hence, only a worker's decision to send a signal affects the promotion outcome. Second, in the No Signal treatment employers select employees, but workers cannot send a signal. As a consequence, imbalanced gender compositions in this treatment can only be attributed to unequal treatment from the employers' side. Figure 1 reports gender compositions in competitive positions across our three treatments. A conspicuous finding is that we observe the highest gender gap when employees can send signals and employers select. That is, we find that only 29.17% of promoted participants in Baseline are females. This gender composition is significantly different from a perfectly balanced distribution (proportion test, p = 0.041).
5 By contrast, more female workers are promoted when employers cannot select employees. In No Selection, it can be seen that the proportion of female workers increases to 37.50%. In this treatment the gender composition is not significantly different from a perfectly balanced distribution (proportion test, p = 0.181). The gender composition is the closest to a perfectly balanced composition in No Signal, where 45.45% of promoted participants are females (proportion test, p = 0.777). To summarize, our data suggest that a gender gap in competitive positions occurs when employees can send signals and employers decide on promotion.
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The second finding indicates that parts of this differential may be driven by employers'
5 Proportion tests are run to compare the observed distributions with theoretical distributions drawn from the numbers of females and males among workers.
6 All statistical analyses also hold for χ 2 tests (Baseline: selection process. The third finding emphasizes that the lion's share of the gender gap may be induced by employees' willingness to apply for promotion. In what follows, we further analyze the drivers of Result 1 in terms of employees' behavior and potential discriminatory behavior from the employers' side. The data emphasized that the gender gap is lowest when workers do not have the ability to signal their willingness to compete. Therefore, in the next section we will focus on workers' decisions to send a signal. Afterwards, we explore the role of employers in the promotion process, and how this may affect the probability of women being promoted.
Gender differences in applications to competitive positions
In this section we only focus on workers and study their inclination to apply for a competitive position. The analysis concentrates on the situations where workers have the opportunity to reveal their willingness to compete by sending a signal. We focus on the treatments where signals can be sent to the employer (Baseline treatment) or to the computer (No Selection treatment).
Our results are in line with previous experimental evidence on gender differences in the willingness to compete (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Masclet et al. 2015; Heinz et al. 2016) . 7 We find in both treatments that women send a signal significantly less often than men. In Baseline, 16.67% of female workers send a signal, whereas this holds for 44.44% of male workers (χ 2 (1) = 6.546, p = 0.011). In No Selection, a significantly lower share of female workers (19.23%) send a signal than male workers (45.45%; χ 2 (1) = 3.814, p = 0.051). Interestingly, the distribution of subjects that send a signal does not significantly differ between the treatment where employers can select the person to be promoted (Baseline) and the treatment where the computer decides (No Selection) (χ 2 (1) = 0.007, p = 0.936). Hence, one might at first conclude that the presence of employers does not influence workers' decision to send signals. However, in the Baseline treatment several channels may be at work. First, similar to the No Selection treatment, it may be that the decision to signal competitiveness is affected by individual risk preferences. Second, it is also likely that female and male workers anticipate that the 7 Note that with the exception of Heinz et al. (2016) these papers do not model employers.
8 employer will receive information on their demographics. Thus, it may be that female and male workers react differently to the presence of employers.
To isolate these effects on the determinants of applying for promotion, we run probit regressions on the probability of sending a signal. We present a regression for each treatment where workers can send a signal (Baseline, No Selection). Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
The regressions control for demographics such as the gender of the worker (female), the number of semesters studied so far (level of study). We also add a dummy which is positive for either economic or business students (economist). The models control for subjects' risk preferences (risk tolerance), measured in part four of our experiment. 8 Finally, score in first tournament controls for participants' ability which is measured as the number of correctly solved puzzles in the mandatory tournament (part two of our experiment). The first column confirms our previous finding, that women are less likely than men to send a signal in Baseline. The second regression suggests that this is not the case in No Selection. That is, the coefficient of female is negatively significant in Baseline and insignificant in No Selection. We find evidence that risk-averse individuals tend to shy away from competition. That is, risk tolerance is positively significant in both treatments. Thus, subjects with a more pronounced degree of risk tolerance are more likely to send a signal. Interestingly, Table 1 shows that the determinants of applying for promotion in No Selection contrast from the ones in Baseline. In No Selection, being a female does not appear to have a significant impact on the decision to send a signal. By contrast, risk tolerance and subject's ability significantly increase the probability of applying for promotion.
The regression results shed new light on the seemingly similar gender gap in competitiveness between the Baseline and the No Selection treatments. Although females in No Selection send a signal significantly less often than men, being a woman per se does not appear to affect this decision.
9 It turns out that the gender difference in risk tolerance is the most compelling argument to explain the observed gender-application gap in this treatment. Indeed, we find in the No Selection subsample that women are significantly more risk averse than men (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.013).
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By contrast, in the Baseline treatment, the signal sent by candidates to the competitive position is considered by the employer, who also has access to information regarding age, level of study, and particularly gender. Women anticipating gender-based discrimination from employers may be reluctant to spend money on a signal that will anyway be disregarded. This is not the case in the No Selection treatment, where the computer automatically promotes the applying worker or makes a random draw if too many workers apply. The anticipation of discriminatory practices may therefore offer a possible explanation for our findings.
11 We summarize the findings in Result 2.
Result 2: (a) In the presence and absence of employers, women send less signals than men. (b) In the presence of employers, female and risk-averse workers send less signals. In the absence of employers, only risk aversion can explain why workers send less signals.

Employers' selection of applicants
In this section we turn to the analysis of employer behavior. Another possible explanation for gender differentials in access to promotion is the presence of discriminatory practices against women. Our data show that the underrepresentation of females in competitive positions narrows down in the No Selection treatment, where employers are not involved in the promotion process. This may be explained by an amplified gender gap induced by discriminatory behavior of the employers in the Baseline treatment. Our previous findings suggest that this may also be caused by women being more eager to apply for the competitive position when no discrimination is possible. We now investigate whether female workers suffer from an unequal treatment in our experiment. We therefore analyze the treatments (Baseline and No Signal ) where employers have the opportunity to decide which worker should be promoted to the competitive position. Before analyzing possible discriminatory behavior, we focus on workers' performance to study whether favoritism of male workers may be justified by performance arguments. In all stages of our experiment we do not observe any gender gap in the task performance. This is supported by MannWhitney tests on gender differences in performance (piece rate: p = 0.437, tournament: p = 0.658, and the selection stage: p = 0.448). This confirms the findings in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . As a consequence, if an employer intends to select the promoted worker solely on a performance criterion, gender should be regarded as irrelevant. Table 4 reports estimates of probit regressions aiming at identifying the determinants of selection in the competitive positions. The models incorporate a dummy (signal ) which is positive when employees send a signal to the employer. We also test for the impact of the information on workers' gender (female). Moreover, we control for the impact of the information regarding workers' demographics (age and level of study).
Model (1) shows that in Baseline workers who send a signal are significantly more often promoted. Interestingly, even when controlling for signal, females are less often selected for job promotion. That is, the coefficient of female is significantly negative. More information can be obtained by having a closer look at the data. When comparing women and men that send a signal, we do not observe any gender inequality in promotion decisions. In that case, 66.67% of women are selected for the tournament, compared to 56.25% of men (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.666). However, significant gender inequality appears when comparing women and men that did not send a signal. In that case, only 10% of women are selected for job promotion as compared to 40% of men (Mann-Whitney Robust standard errors in parentheses * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 test, p = 0.013). This finding is confirmed in Model (2) of table 2. In this regression we include a new interaction variable: female × signal. The coefficient associated with this variable is weakly significant, with the opposite sign, and has a similar amplitude to the female coefficient. This suggests that sending a signal cancels out the penalty of being a female on the probability of being selected.
Model (3) reports estimates in the No Selection treatment. Here, the selection process is carried out by the computer that uses only the signal sent as a determinant of choice. Our regression results in Model (3) validate this approach and highlight that the coefficient associated with signal is highly significant and positive. This demonstrates that only the signal mattered in the selection process. Model (4) reports estimates in the No Signal treatment. Here, employers select a worker to be promoted without having any information about the worker's willingness to compete. In this context, we find that the coefficient associated with female is insignificant. Hence, women do not appear to be generally discriminated against in the No Signal treatment. Although we do not find evidence of discrimination in the No Signal treatment, where employers' decisions cannot be affected by workers' willingness to compete, our data suggest the presence of unequal treatment in the Baseline treatment. Women who do not display a willingness to apply for promotion are significantly less often promoted than men in the same position. An interpretation may be that employers in the Baseline treatment interpret a worker's application for promotion as a signal of a high-performing or motivated worker. This is probably the reason why workers who send a signal are most often promoted. Hence, female workers have the chance to outpace male competitors by sending a signal. The functioning of this process was demonstrated by the significantly positive effect of female × signal in Model (2). However, if workers do not send signals the employer has to hold a belief on workers' performance in the task. In this case, it is possible that employers in Baseline may hold the belief (wrongly) 12 that male workers achieve a better performance than women. As a consequence, it is possible for them to discriminate against women and show a preference for male non-applicants.
Our experimental design allows us to get some input into the role of beliefs in the selection process. While workers were performing the task in game three, we asked employers a series of questions regarding their beliefs on workers' performance. More precisely, they were asked to rank the three workers of the firm from the best performing to the worst performing, according to their beliefs. We find that employer's ranking is directly related to their decision in the selection process. Females are considered on average as less performing than males in the Baseline treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.002) and to a lesser extent in the No Signal treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.073). When comparing only women and men who sent a signal in the Baseline treatment, no gender difference is found (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.666). This support our interpretation that signaling willingness to compete cancels out the pre-existing prejudice against females.
Discussion
Several precautions should be taken when interpreting and extrapolating our findings. First, we acknowledge that a contextualized lab experiment is unlikely to capture the whole complexity of existing promotion processes. Our experiment aims at identifying specific behavioral mechanisms that cannot be observed in non-experimental data. We do believe that laboratory experiments do not compete with other empirical approaches, but are rather complementary. Second, promotions in our experimental setting are based on the experimental design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) . We therefore apply a tournament-based remuneration scheme where the expected value does not exceed the alternative piece-rate scheme. Although this may narrow down the scope of our study on promotion to competitive positions, it allows direct comparisons to existing experimental studies.
We find that women apply less frequently than men to competitive positions, i.e., they send signals significantly less often. This finding echoes previous experimental evidence of women behaving less competitive than men (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Niederle et al. 2013; Buser et al. 2014; Wozniak et al. 2014 ). This gender gap in competitiveness can partly be explained by women being more risk averse than men.
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Extending the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) framework by adding the demand-side represented by an employer, offers interesting new insights. Our regression analysis suggests that being a female is relevant in the decision to apply for the competitive position when an employer has decision power. This is, however, no longer the case when the employer does not take part in the selection process (No Selection) . This observation points to women anticipating discriminatory behavior from employers in Baseline. However, this does not mean that taking discretionary power away from employers is sufficient to achieve gender equality in the willingness to compete. Other determinants, such as risk aversion, persist even in the absence of an employer and prevent the gender gap from significantly decreasing.
14 Ironically, the only evidence of gender prejudice that we observe is directed toward women who do not exhibit a willingness to compete. When workers have the ability to send a signal to the employer, we observe that women who ask for a promotion are not disadvantaged compared to men. More than a claim on one's willingness to compete, the signal may be interpreted by the employer as a proxy for productivity and/or motivation. In our experiment employers, on average, perceive female workers as less productive than male workers. However, there is no gender difference in performance. Interestingly, the (inaccurate) stereotype on performance is not held for women who send a signal. By contrast, in the No Signal treatment, workers do not have the opportunity to express their willingness to compete. In this context, we do not observe any discrimination against women. In this treatment the gender composition in competitive positions is close to being perfectly balanced. The "signaling institution" may therefore be considered at the heart of the issues leading to gender inequality in access to promotion. One should, however, question the relevance of a working environment where individuals cannot express their preferences. So far, our analysis has pertained to the attainment of gender equality in promotion. Reaching perfect gender equality may, however, be undesirable, if it implies that women are assigned to positions that they are not aiming at.
Conclusion
In the current paper, we investigate gender differences in access to competitive positions when both workers and employers are active in the promotion process. We implement a simple experiment where workers can signal their willingness to be promoted to the competitive position and employers have a final say on the matter. We find that women are significantly less likely to be promoted. This is a consequence of the interplay between the supply-side (gender difference in competitiveness) and the demand-side (employer discrimination) in our experimental labor market. To disentangle between both channels, we implement two control treatments that either limit workers expressing their preferences (No Selection) or limit an employer's role in the promotion process (No Signal ).
We report three main findings. First, gender disparity in competitive positions is highest when both employer and workers interact within the promotion process. It significantly decreases when the employer does not have discretionary power. In stark contrast, the gender composition among promoted participants is close to being perfectly balanced in a situation where employers select with no information on the willingness to compete. Second, women apply for the competitive position significantly less often than men. Although gender differences in risk tolerance appear to be the main driver of this gender gap, our data suggest that women may anticipate discriminatory behavior from the employer. Third, we do not find evidence of discriminatory behavior from employers when they are not informed of workers' willingness to compete. In an environment where workers have the ability to signal themselves, women who do not send a signal are significantly less likely to be promoted compared to men in the same situation. However, women signaling themselves do not suffer from unequal treatment. While employer discrimination is still at the heart of current policy debates, our findings rather point to the role of workers' preferences. If gender parity is a desirable outcome, the supply-side of the labor market would be the relevant policy target.
Instructions to the Experiment
You will now participate in an experiment. Please stop talking to other participants and switch off your cell phone.
The experiment encompasses four different parts. In each of these four parts you have to take on or several decisions. In this respect, you can earn money. The amount you earn depends on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants.
At the end of the experiment the computer randomly selects one of the four parts. This part will be payoff relevant. You will also receive a show-up fee of 5 Euros for participating in this experiment. At the end of the experiment you will be informed of your payoff in Euro in the selected part. We will also inform you on the total payoff you earned. Afterwards you will receive this payoff in cash. Please take your time to reach your decisions. All decisions will be treated anonymously. You will be asked to answer a general questionnaire. After every participants complete this questionnaire, we will hand out the instructions of part 1.
Before we start with parts 1-4 we ask you to complete a questionnaire. This questionnaire includes some short questions regarding your field of study, the semester you are registered in, the number of participations in former experiments, your gender, and your age. During the experiment it may happen that other participants will be informed of your age, your gender, or your level of study. Other answers will never be submitted to any of the other participants. Moreover, you name will never be revealed, neither to the other participants, nor to the experimenter.
Part 1
In part 1 you will participate in a working task. Your profit will depend on the number of correctly solved questions in this task.
Working task: functionality  The working task will be processed on the computer. You have to calculate sums of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers.  In total, you have five minutes to calculate as many sums as you want.  Therefore, you are not allowed to use a pocket calculator or your cell phone.  You will be given scratch paper and pens to conduct your calculations.  You a use the ke oard to t pe our i puts i the field " su . To alidate our i put, ou ha e to li k ith the ouse o the utto : " OK .
The following picture presents you how a possible working task may look like.
Working task: compensation  You are paid a piece rate of 0.50 Euros for each correctly solved question.
If this part is selected to be payoff relevant, you will be informed ofn the total number of correctly solved tasks and on the resulting earnings, at the end of the experiment. In this case, your total payoff will depend on the earnings in this part plus the show-up fee of 5 Euros.
Please raise your hand, if you have any questions. After the end of this part we will hand out the instructions for part 2.
Part 2
In this part, you participate for five minutes in the same working task as in part 1. The functioning of the working task is identical as in part 1. The only difference is the way your performance is remunerated. Whereas, you received a fixed piece rate in part 1, you will participate in a tournament in part 2. The tournament outcome will determine your profit for this part.
Tournament remuneration:
Before the working task starts, you will be randomly matched with two other participants. You will never be informed on the identity of these persons. After the five minutes have elapsed the computer will determine your total number of correctly solved problems. In contrast to part 1 your remuneration will now depend on your relative performance in the tournament compared to the performance of the two other persons.
The person with the highest number of correctly solved problems will be the winner of the tournament. In case of a tie, the computer will randomly draw the winner of the tournament.
Two cases are possible. Please raise your hand, if you have any questions. After the end of this part we will hand out the instructions for part 3.
Part 3 [BASELINE Treatment]
In part 3, participants in the room are allocated to firms. Each firm includes one employer and three workers. In the beginning of part 3, the computer randomly allocates you a role. Moreover, the computer randomly matches three workers to each employer. In total, the computer will set-up six firms.
Before part 3 starts you will be given information on your allocated role. Therefore, please click on the button see my role . I this part the workers will participate in the same working task as in parts 1 and 2. They will either work under a piece rate or participate in a tournament.
In part 3, the workers receive an endowment of 0.20 Euros.
Part 3 encompasses three stages:
1.) Workers have the possibility to send a request for the participation in the tournament to the employer. 2.) Employers will be informed of the requests sent, as well as other information on workers in the firm.
They will select one worker that will participate in the tournament. 3.) The workers participate in the working task and either work under a tournament or a piece rate.
Stage 1: Request for participating in the tournament
In this stage, the workers first have the possibility to state whether they would like to work under a tournament or a piece rate.
A worker who wants to participate in the tournament can send a request for tournament participation to the employer. This request costs 0.20 Euros and will be subtracted from the endowment received at the beginning of part 3. Please note that tournament participation is subject to the choice of the employer only. Sending a request does not ensure to enter tournament. Participants that did not send a request are also eligible to participate in the tournament.
Stage 2: Employer selection of remuneration schemes
In stage 2, the employer will be informed on the level of study (current semester), the age and the gender of each of the three workers in the firm. Moreover, the employer will be informed whether the worker has sent a request for tournament participation. The employer decides which worker will enter the tournament and which workers will be paid under a piece rate.
Here, the following rules apply:
 The employer must exactly select one worker for the participation in the tournament.  The employer must exactly select two workers to work under a piece rate.
To ake our de isio s, please just li k o the desired he k o tour a e t parti ipatio or piece rate parti ipatio ehi d the prese ted worker. Please make this decision for all three workers on the screen.
Stage 3: Participation in the working task
The workers will be informed of the decision of the employer. Afterwards, they will participate in the working task for five minutes. In the meantime, the employers will face a short questionnaire.
If you work under a piece rate:  You receive for each correctly solved problem a piece rate of 0.50 Euros.
If you work under a tournament:
 Your remuneration will depend on your relative performance in the tournament compared to the performance of two other participants (working in two other firms).  The participant who solved the most questions correctly wins the tournament and will be paid. The other two participants will not be compensated. In case of a tie, the computer will randomly determine the winner of the tournament.  The two opponents are participants from different firms who also have been selected by their employer to participate in the tournament.
Two cases are possible. The remuneration of the employers directly depends on the performance of the worker participating in the tournament and on the performance of the two workers who work under the piece rate.
If part 3 is selected to be payoff relevant the employer will earn:  1 Euro for each correctly solved question by the worker who worked in the tournament. This is, however, only the case if this worker won the tournament. The employer will earn nothing from the tournament if the worker loses it.  The employers will earn in any case 0.20 Euros for each correctly solved problem of the two workers who work under a piece rate.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. After the end of this part we will hand out the instructions for part 4.
